I. Introduction
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 1 and the subsequent allied international legal agreements (and related measures) that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 2 is fast approaching its golden anniversary. 3 From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to imagine Antarctica without some established form of legal governance --a non-juridical Antarctica. Like a number of other perceived essentials, it seems certain if the ATS did not exist, "it would have to be invented". The ATS is comprised of: i) the Antarctic Treaty, ii) the more than 200 measures in effect under the Treaty, and iii) associated treaties, and their related measures, that are in force. Art. 1(e), Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991) (Madrid Protocol) , 30 ILM 1455 30 ILM (1991 . Times, Feb. 26, 2007, p. A4, col. 3 ; Celebrating the Anniversaries of the International Polar Years and International Geophysical Year, 150 Cong. Rec. S 11323, 108 th Cong., 2d sess. (Oct. 11, 2004) . 4 This phrase has been used frequently in the context of international organization, highlighting the importance of international cooperation through formalized structures. See, e.g., GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 748 (1951) (on the need for the United Nations); JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRS 509 (1978) (on the need for European organization); Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORGANIZATION 325, 355 (1982) This is especially true today when global contact with Antarctica in terms of science, exploration, exploitation of marine resources, and tourism continues to expand and grow in importance.
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In these circumstances, the presence of effective regulation which serves as a driver of international cooperation is more and more imperative.
As attention to Antarctica has increased over the past forty-nine years, the ATS has been subject to periodic pressures and tensions, but especially so since the end of the 1970s. From at least 1975, differences (sometimes acrimonious)
concerning Antarctic resources, access, and governance began to make themselves felt between and across groups of claimant and non-claimant states, 6 parties and non-parties, 7 and developed and developing states. States purporting to exercise, assert or claim territorial sovereignty are generally known as "claimant" states despite clear distinctions between "exercise, assert or claim". "Non-claimant" states are those that do not accept the validity of claims that have been made by other states and, in addition, neither advance a territorial claim themselves, nor (except for the U.S. and Russia) assert a historic basis for doing so. See ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 119-120 (1992). 7 This includes differences between the sub-groups of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), with powers of participation and decision-making and Antarctic Treaty NonConsultative Parties (ATNCPs), without such powers. For the meaning of these terms see Revised Rules of Procedure (2005) 'L L. 195, 199-208 (1985) .
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For sapient accounts and analysis of the continuing effectiveness and legitimacy of the ATS, see OLAV SCHRAM STOKKE & DAVOR VIDAS, GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY  OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 35, 37-45 (1996) Today's claims, however, would be pressed in a world where increasing population and resource scarcity are much greater than when the claims were "frozen." It is easy to imagine the heightened instability, competition and tension this would create. Accordingly, threats to the ATS pose serious risks and ought to be avoided.
While the ATS is not near failure or even a crisis, the recent assertion of maritime jurisdiction by Australian courts over a Japanese whaling company for acts contrary to Australian law in the Antarctic Southern Ocean is alarming. Under s 475(7) of the EPBC Act, HSI was determined to be an "interested person" for the purpose of standing, presumably on the basis that during the two years prior to the acts complained of HSI had engaged in activities related to the protection of whales in furtherance of its objects or purposes. Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., [2004] FCA 1510, at [15] . see EPBC Act s 475(7)(b).
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Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 Proclamation, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GAZETTE (SPECIAL), No. S 290, Friday, 29 July 1994 (1994 . Australian nationals and non-nationals within the AWS, but only to non-nationals beyond the outer limits of the AWS.
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One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order to be granted leave to serve process in Japan was that the violation complained of took place "in the Commwealth". Violation would arise presumably because either Australia does not have good title to Antarctic territory from which project an EEZ or even it that was so the extension of Australia's Antarctic claim to the EEZ is prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. I return to these issues below. "should not exercise a discretion to place the Court in such a position" and denied the application for leave to serve process in Japan. Antarctic EEZ is the high seas which is not subject to any legitimate control by
Australia under UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such as the EPBC Act)."
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The conflicting positions thus contrasted, Allsop accepted the Attoney-General's position that international discord that would follow by granting leave to serve process and it became "uncessary to decide whether the Antarctic EEZ is, or can be seen as, "in the Commonwealth".
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Significantly too, Allsop noted cultural differences with respect to whaling and hinted that the current stigma attached to whaling might signal a move away from conservation and sustainable utilization to a wish by some to preserve charismatic mega-fauna at all costs. Taking a more dualistic, traditional approach to the underlying legal and international relations issues, none of the appellate judges gave any weight to the international political considerations raised by the Attorney-General. Even the dissent was in agreement on this point stating that:
[c]ourts must be prepared to hear and determine matters whatever their political sensitivity either domestically or internationally. To approach the matter otherwise, is to compromise the role of the courts as a forum in 
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But, given the current government's position, one is still left to wonder if it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will act against Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the ATT EEZ. This makes it opportune, for the remainder of this article, to consider the implications of such a possibility for stability in Antarctic governance.
III. Implications for ATS Stability
The HSI case establishes that the application and enforcement of the AWS provisions as applied to the AAT under the EPBC Act in a private action, against
Australian non-nationals, by Australian courts, is not barred by Australian law.
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From an international law perspective this is unfortunate. It is even more so, when one considers the ramifications for the stability of the ATS. Nor will the doctrine of futility preclude such an action where it is clear that enforcement will be next to impossible, at least where public interest injunctions are concerned. In thinking about the use of jurisdiction established under Antarctic claims to territory and maritime zones as a way to provide protection to whales in the Southern Ocean, it is necessary to consider the nature of that jurisdiction. In turn, this requires a consideration of the ways in which both sovereignty and jurisdiction has been addressed by the ATS. In relation to the sovereignty issue, it is important to recognize that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty   54 has not solved the conflict so much as it has structured a form a words that allow all parties to ambiguously look past the issue of territorial claims in order to identify with each other on agreed objectives.
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The admonition of Professor Watts is worth repeating here: . 195, 199-204 (1985) . Yet, however satisfactory the results of Article IV have been so far, there are certain limits to its operation and effectiveness. These limits are sometimes obscured by the very success that Article IV has so far had and the tendency to get around its complex drafting by summarizing its broad effect by some such phrase as that it "suspends sovereignty claims" in Antarctica or that it has put "sovereignty in abeyance."
What is important to always bear in mind is that the various national claims to and rights of sovereignty in Antarctica are still very much alive -as is equally the opposition to them of those states that do not
recognize them. The underlying differences of view remain. In that sense, Article IV has not "solved" the problem. What it has done is provide a basis on which conflicts arising out of those continuing differences can be avoided.
. . . Take Article IV away, and sovereignty rights and claims, and opposition to them, will immediately re-emerge, undiminished in vigor. In an extreme case, involving in some way the Antarctic Treaty or at least
Article IV ceasing to be in force, the consequential possibility of a resurgence of conflicts over sovereignty is readily apparent. JANUARY 7-13, 1985 , 70-71 (National Academy Press, 1986 It is important to note that the ATS does not seek to regulate Antarctica and its marine environment in its entirety. Indeed, whales are expressly excluded from the ATS in a number of places and it is important to bear in mind that there are existing multilateral agreements that are both consistent with the ATS and do apply to whales in the seas adjacent to Antarctica. Rather, the argument here is that the contentious and almost entirely unrecognized exercise of jurisdiction within the ATS over nonnationals in waters adjacent to Antarctica for the purpose of regulating whaling is unsound. It is likely to lead to less overall environmental protection in Antarctica if it engenders conflict and competition.
The crux of the HSI dispute (and any progeny it brings forth) is whaling. is better than destabilizing the ATS -an extremely important regime of broader scope and objective.
IV. Conclusion
It is a truism that good faith cooperation between states is required to successfully tackle environmental and resource problems which are international in MARINE ENVIRONMENT 147, 162-63 (2003) . 65 Indeed, David Victor claims that the uneasy status quo within the whaling regime is as good as it gets and that forcing any plausible alternative will lead to losers who will abandon the regime. David Victor, Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime Does Not Need to be Fixed, in ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, ED., TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 292, 304-305 (2001) . In the same volume Milton Freeman makes a similar observation: "It would be naïve not to recognize that for the majority of participants in IWC discussions, the current nonresolution . . . is the desired outcome. Milton M.R. Freeman, Is Money the Root of the Problem? Cultural Conflicts in the IWC, in Id., 125. The same could be said of the solution afforded by the ATS and that introducing unilateral exercises of jurisdiction over non-nationals will also lead to regime abandonment. scope.
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In the case of whale stocks, a res nullius common property resource, 67 cooperation is required on account of the externalities that have driven unsustainable exploitation.
It is well known that over the past 10 years or so the struggle between the conservation and utilisation camps within the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has intensified as stocks (at least minke whale stocks) have apparently been gradually replenished since the whaling moratorium. The recent HSI case, and the broader context in which it arises, has the potential to dangerously destabilize the ATS. At bottom, this potential is driven by
